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This paper examines analytically the possibility that, due to the
limitedness of its resources, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
could spread financial crises rather than preventing them, thus
developing into a contagion channel. The model we build, based
on the most recent global-games literature, allows us to show that
this risk is sensible from a theoretical point of view. We conclude
that the IMF, when planning its interventions, should take into
account this kind of contagion it contributes in creating. Some
policy implications are derived. [JEL Classifications: F33, F34]
1. - Introduction
«Back in 1997, then US Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence
Summers liked to compare modern finance to a jet plane. The
technology of modern finance, like a jet plane, lets you get to your
destination faster then older transportation technology. But the
rare crashes that occur along the way are also more spectacular.
[...] This analogy now seems to suffer from one problem.
Emerging-market economies crash more frequently than 747s».
In the last ten years, international financial crises followed
one another at an impressing rate and showed new characteristics
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1 ROUBINI N. - SETSER B., Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises
in Emerging Economies, 2004.that made them particularly harmful. From the 1995 tequila crisis
to the last Brazilian one in 2002, we can count up to fourteen
crisis episodes, to number just the most important cases,
characterized by great pressures on countries capital accounts
and by impressive capital runs. A fairly widespread theory
between economists, attributes the last years crises to debtor
countries illiquidity, and claims that financial panic, investors
self-fulfilling expectations and contagion from similar-perceived
countries, may explain — sometimes even more than emerging
markets’ own soundness — sudden capital runs. In this context,
an International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR), acting as a lender
of last resort for illiquid (but solvent) countries, can play an
important role in reducing the frequency of crises. An ILLR may
mitigate investors’ coordination problems, thus preventing capital
runs and reducing the probability of a crisis for each level of the
fundamentals. 
Nowadays the institution that comes closest to an ILLR, is
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, the magnitude of the
most recent financial crises showed that the resources the IMF
can rely on to exert this function are limited-limited especially if
compared to the liquidity gaps that emerged in the last years. This
essay is aimed at examining a specific problem that may stem out
of the limitation of the Fund resources. We asked ourselves
whether, due to the inadequacy of its funds, the IMF could spread
financial crises rather than preventing them: in this sense, it risks
developing, from a crisis prevention and management tool, into a
channel of contagion. In periods in which crises take big
proportions, the limitation of IMF resources may foster investors’
fear that it does not have enough funds to bail out all the
economies. In this case, the breakout of a crisis in one country
can generate panic between creditors, trigger capital runs from
other risky economies, and facilitate crisis transmission. In this
respect, Claessens et al. (2000) write: 
«Other reasons [for contagion] could include concern about
the supply of funds from international lenders of last resort. In
late 1998, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
found itself called on to rescue so many countries that economists
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liquidity crises. Thus a liquidity crisis in one country could trigger
a run on other countries out of fear that the last eligible country
would be out of luck».
Traditionally, literature has developed the themes of
International Lending of Last Resort and contagion separately. In
examining the limitation of ILLR resources, economists focused
on the necessity of implementing partial bailouts, interventions
aimed at persuading creditors to invest in the crisis-hit country
(catalytic finance). The first theoretical models developed to
examine the effectiveness of catalytic finance, treat the probability
of a crisis as exogenous, generate multiple equilibria, and are quite
pessimistic toward the effectiveness of this kind of interventions.
Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) build an open economy model à la
Diamond-Dybvig that allows showing that, under certain
conditions, a partial bailout may increase the probability of both
domestic financial crises and twin crises. Zettelmeyer (1998), by
means of creating a self-fulfilling run model derived from
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), finds that, with multiple equilibria,
a partial intervention raises investors incentives to withdraw their
funds and ends up worsening an ongoing crisis. 
Conversely, more recent models that treat the probability of
a crisis as endogenous, seem to prove the effectiveness of catalytic
finance. Morris and Shin (2003) global-game model shows that, if
catalytic finance is not perceived as a substitute for government
and investors’ actions, it is effective in stimulating private
investments and reducing the ex-ante probability of a crisis.
Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2003, 2004) show that an
increase in the size of ILLR interventions in the event of a crisis,
decreases the threshold values for the fundamentals below which
investors choose to withdraw their funds, thus making a crisis less
likely ex-ante. The authors ascribe this effect to the coordination
of investors’ expectations that derives from the intervention of the
lender. Penalver (2004) finds that, if the ILLR lends liquidity at
an interest rate below the market rate, debtor country’s
government will be encouraged to implement policy measures that
reduce the probability of future crises. Investors will be more
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Rochet and Vives (2004) show that, under certain conditions,
solvent but illiquid debtors are forced to default due to investors’
coordination problems. The intervention of an ILLR helps in
solving this kind of problem. 
Though these works examine an important implication of the
limitation of ILLR resources — the necessity of partial bailouts
and their effectiveness — they do not relate funds inadequacy to
the possible contagion that could originate from it. 
On the other hand, literature on contagion highlighted many
channels of crisis transmission. Trade links shown by Corsetti,
Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (1999), the common lender channel
theoretically exposed by Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) and
empirically tested by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), several types
of herd behavior, such as the one made known by Calvo (1999),
are just a few of the most important mechanisms. Nonetheless,
economists confined themselves to reporting without any formal
framework the possibility that an ILLR may become a source of
contagion, without developing, as far as we know, any model. 
In this essay, we will use for the first time a theoretical model
to examine analytically the risk that IMF limited resources may
turn it into a contagion channel. To this purpose, we employ a
modified version of Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2003, 2004)
global-game model
2. The fundamental hypothesis underlying our
analysis is that IMF resources are limited but enough to partially
bail out all the economies potentially exposed to the risk of default.
The first important result we derived is very similar to the one
obtained by CGR: the partial intervention of an ILLR that commits
itself to intervening in order to compensate investors’ losses in the
event of a default, makes creditors less keen on liquidating their
investments, and is effective in reducing the ex-ante probability of
a crisis in emerging-market economies. The changes we make to
the original model — in particular its extension to two countries
and the fact that IMF intervention is made conditional to a crisis
— allows us to gain new insights. If the IMF has limited resources,
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
72
2 Hereafter, we will refer to the original model using the acronym CGR.the default of a country will reduce the funds available to manage
potential crises in other economies. Creditors will perceive their
investment in the other emerging markets to be less sheltered, and
will become more eager to liquidate them, thus exposing these
countries to greater risks. We prove that the limitation of IMF
resources creates a positive correlation between the probabilities
of default of different economies, and makes crises to transmit
more easily between countries, via investors’ expectations. The
IMF, in other words, may become a contagion channel.
Finally, we analyze the effect of this kind of contagion on the
Fund optimal behavior. We find that the IMF should take into
account this mechanism in order to effectively plan its
interventions in emerging markets. In particular, it is necessary to
provide more funds to the countries from which a crisis is more
likely to spread. Moreover, in order to ensure the effectiveness of
interventions, it is essential that the IMF be able to credibly
commit itself to the actual disbursement of the promised funds.
In what follows, we highlight the limitation of IMF funds,
analyzing their trend during the crises of the last years (section
2). Section 3 presents the modified version of CGR global-game
model. In section 4, we draw the conclusions of our analysis.
2. - IMF Resources
At present, the main function of the IMF — which makes it
very similar to an ILLR — consists in helping countries
experiencing BoP disequilibria, by means of supplying various
kinds of loans. Yet, the resources it can rely on to exert this
activity, are limited. In appendix A we list the different types of
resources used by the IMF to provide its loans, and show that the
existence of borrowing arrangements signed with official creditors,
is not enough to question the limitedness of its funds. In the
following paragraph, we analyze the trend of its resources during
the most recent crises
3. 
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3 In this section, the data we denote as present refer to 31 december 2004.2.1 The Last Years Crises
Have there been periods in which IMF funds clearly seemed
to be inadequate to the size and number of necessary interventions?
To  answer this question, we analyzed the uncommitted usable
resource’s trend from December 1996 to July 2004. Graph 1 shows
their movements in the analyzed period, and relates it to the
development of total committed resources, the funds attributed by
the IMF to some troubled countries
4. It comes out from the graphic
that the resources available for the provision of new loans
underwent a indisputable depletion, between the end of 1997 and
the first months of 1999, touching a minimum of $29.8 billion in
December 1998. As it is clear from Graph 2 (Appendix A), which
relates total committed resources to the commitments towards
each economy, this plunge was caused by IMF huge interventions
that followed the 1997 Asian crisis and the ones that stroke Russia,
Brazil and Ukraine the following year
5. The worrying depletion of
the Fund resources caused by these bailouts was made evident also
by the activation, in 1998, of the borrowing arrangements available
to the IMF, GAB and NAB, to finance respectively the Russian and
the Brazilian rescues. Moreover, it was not accidental that during
the Eleventh General Review, which took place in 1998 as well, a
45% increase in quotas was decided: clearly, due to the great size
of those years’ crises, even the IMF directive boards were worried
about the inadequacy of its resources. Thus, from the analysis of
the available funds during the last years, it comes out that in the
period 1997-1999 they were possibly inadequate to manage so
many simultaneous crisis episodes.
Due to the 1997 Asian crisis, the amount of liquidity the IMF
could use to provide new loans, fell sharply. According to some
analysts, this initial depletion of resources could have shown
investors the limitation of IMF funds. This could have raised
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4 A description of these aggregates, as well as a detailed explanation of the
procedures followed for their calculation, is contained in Appendix A. 
5 The size of these bailouts was unprecedented in the history of the Fund, so
that in order to cope with them, a new type of loan was introduced, the
Supplemental Reserve Facility, which could overcome the quantitative limits usually
applied to rescue packages.foreign creditors’ fear that IMF resources would have not been
enough to bail out all the economies. Hence, they could have had
more incentives to withdraw their capitals from the countries
perceived to be the riskiest — Russia and Brazil — thus facilitating
the outbreak of a crisis in these two economies. Therefore, the
Fund could have eased the contagious spread of the crisis towards
Russia and Brazil. In order to prove undoubtedly that this really
happened, it would be necessary to run an empiric test, which
goes beyond the aim of this essay. Nevertheless, the evidence from
the data is consistent with this hypothesis
6. 
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6 Notice that the increase in quotas decided during the Eleventh Revision
allowed the Fund to cope with less problems with the crises that in the following
years hit Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey.
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Total committed resourcesWe  therefore conclude our analysis of IMF resources stating
that, between 1997 and 1999, the limitation of IMF resources is
very likely to have enhanced the transmission of crises from Asian
economies to Russia and Brazil. 
The data we examined suggest that the Fund could have really
acted as a channel of contagion.
3. - A Model of Catalytic Finance
In order to examine analytically the risk that the IMF develops
into a contagion channel, we used a global-game model that
constitutes an adaptation of CGR (2003, 2004).
3.1 Temporal Structure of the Model
There are two emerging-market economies, A and B. In each
country, action develops in three periods. 
Period 1 (Investment): Each economy has initial endowments
E, borrows D from a continuum of foreign investors and invests
(E+D) in an international liquid asset, M, and in risky and illiquid
investment projects, I, which mature in two period. If they are
kept in place for two periods, they yield a stochastic rate of return
equal to Rj (where j specifies the country to which we refer); if
they are liquidated early, after one period, they yield (Rj/1+k),
with k>0. E, D, I, M and k are given parameters. The interest rate
applied to private credit is normalized to zero for simplicity. 
The size of λj is announced. The definition of this value will
be given in the next paragraph. 
Period 2 (Withdrawal): Rj realizes. Foreign investors have the
possibility to withdraw their funds in advance. If we denote with
x the fraction of creditors who choose the withdrawal, xD will be
the liquidity need of the country. It can be met by international
reserves  M or, if these are not enough, by the (costly and
inefficient) liquidation of a fraction z of investment projects.
Period 3 (Possible default): Investment projects mature. The
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76country resources will be equal to the return of completed
projects, plus the liquidity left over after paying xD to foreign
creditors in the previous period. The country will have to provide
(1–xD) to those who left their capital invested for two periods.
The difference between returns and disbursements constitute the
country net returns:
(1)
where the notation (M–x D )+ indicates the max{M–x D , 0}.
If net returns are negative, the country is forced to default;
this happens when
(2) Rj(1–z)I<(1–x)D
In order to expose the two economies to the risk of a crisis
in different periods, we built a game which develops over six times:
at times 1, 2, and 3 respectively investment, withdrawal of funds,
and possible default, take place in country A; at times 4, 5, and
6 the same sequence of events takes place in B. 
3.2 IMF Intervention
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, at time 1 the IMF
commits itself to provide country A with a certain amount of funds
λA in the event that, at time 3, it is forced to default. The
disbursement of these funds is very likely to be subject to some
degree of conditionality. In the event of a crisis, the hit country
should commit itself to implement some policies and internal
reforms that can be useful to prevent possible future defaults and
to ensure that the country be able to refund the IMF. We assume
that A will use these resources to partially compensate its creditors
for their losses. So, at t = 3, in the event of a default, each creditor
of country A will receive a reimbursement equal to λA (given
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77parameter). We assume it not to entirely cover investor’s loss.
Similarly, at time 4 the Fund commits itself to provide each
creditor of country B with λB at t = 6, if a crisis occurs. 
The fundamental hypothesis of our model is the limitation of
IMF resources. From this assumption follows that the amount of
liquidity the Fund can give to B varies accordingly to what
happened in the other economy in the previous periods. If country
A has not been forced to default, each creditor of B will receive
a reimbursement equal to Λ. If, however, A has incurred a crisis,
the Fund will pledge to every creditor of B λR = Λ – λA (the
subscript R stands for residual). Λ and λA are given parameters.
3.3 Investors’ Payoffs and Information
The relevant characteristic of payoffs is that they depend on
investors having chosen the behavior that, ex-post, reveals to be
the “right” one. The difference in utility between debt-rollover and
early withdrawal of funds will be a positive constant b, if the
country is not forced to default. If, however, a crisis occurs, that
same difference will be negative and equal to –(c–λj), where c is
a constant and λj<c. Therefore, the IMF reduces (but not
eliminates) the negative payoff each investor will get if, after
having chosen debt rollover, the country is hit by a crisis. 
A peculiarity of global-game models, which distinguishes them
from models with multiple equilibria derived from Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), is the lack of common knowledge
7. In our case, in
order to decide whether to withdraw their capital from country j,
investors get two kinds of information:
— public information on Rj. Investors know that Rj is
normally distributed with average Rj,M and variance 1/ρ. They
can not observe it directly, but receive about it a
— private information affected by the stochastic noise εj, with
normal distribution and c.d.f. G(εj): the signal received by
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
78
7 This means that the agents’ private information is heterogeneous and affected
by some stochastic disturbance: players do not know others’ behavior in
equilibrium, neither do they have the same perception of the economy.investors, at time 2 for country A, at time 5 for country B, is sj =
Rj + εj; the precision of private information is αj.
We assume the distributions of Rj and the c.d.f. of stochastic
noises G(εj) to be the same in both the countries. Following CGR,
we assume that ρ/α→0, which allows us to ignore the interaction
between the two types of information.
3.4 Strategies and Threshold Values
We  assume investors to employ a trigger strategy to decide
whether to withdraw their funds from country j: they will
withdraw their capital if and only if the signal they receive about
economy j should follow below (or be equal to) sj*, the threshold
value:
sj ≤ sj*
The payoff each agent gets in case of debt-rollover, is a positive
function of the number of other investors that choose not to
withdraw their funds
8. Therefore, in order to determine the
threshold value, every agent will try to estimate the fraction of
other creditors that will choose withdrawal. In this respect, the
agents’ decisions are strategic complements, generating
coordination problems and raising the probability of a crisis.
Given the fraction of investors who decide to withdraw their
capital after just one period, we can derive the threshold value of
the fundamental, R –
j, defined as the rate of return below which j
will be forced to default
9:
(3)
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8  This happens because, by means of early withdrawing their financings,
creditors cause costly liquidation of investment projects, which increase the
probability of a default.
9 See Appendix B for the derivation of this threshold value.3.5 The Equilibrium in Country B
In equilibrium in each country the probability of a crisis is
endogenous and determined jointly by fundamentals and investors’
coordination problems. Each country is characterized by a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, described by the two threshold values R –
j and
sj*. Proceeding backwards, we will now examine the equilibrium
in country B.
3.5.1 Threshold Values in Equilibrium
The equilibrium in country B is characterized by the threshold
values sB* and R –
B defined by the following equations
(4)
(5)
See Appendix B for the derivation of these values.
3.5.2 Size of Intervention and Probability of a Crisis
Following CGR we can prove the following
PROPOSITION 1. The ex-ante default probability in country B is
a positive function of the threshold values R –
B and sB*
(6)
Deriving (6) with respect to λB we can prove.
PROPOSITION 2. An increase in the amount of liquidity granted
to each foreign investor in the event of a default, reduces the
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80threshold values R –
B and sB*; therefore, these are negative functions
of the size of ILLR intervention
10.
(7)
From (6) and (7) follows 
PROPOSITION 3. An increase in the liquidity pledged to every
investor in the event of a default, reduces the ex-ante probability
of a crisis in country B.
(8)
The intervention of an ILLR which, following a crisis, provides
the debtor country with resources that allow it to partially honor
its debts, reduces the ex-ante probability of a crisis. This happens
because investors know that the loss they will suffer in the event
of a default, will be mitigated by the funds supplied by the IMF:
the payoff creditors will get if they choose not to withdraw their
capital and subsequently the emerging market is forced to default,
will be less negative (see par. 3.3). The conditional payoff
alteration influences the expected payoff: each creditor will be
keener to rollover the debt for each level of the fundamental, as
shown in (7). The reduced speculative aggressiveness will lessen
the fraction of creditors who choose to early withdraw their capital
at time 5. Consequently, the projects’ rate of return needed to avoid
the default in B, will decrease (see (7)). The reduction in both
threshold values will cause a fall in the ex-ante probability of a
crisis (see (6)). In this model, the only effect of ILLR intervention
on the probability of a crisis is an indirect one. Anticipating the
IMF aid, in fact, agents alter their own behavior: what reduces
the probability of a crisis is the modification in investors’ conduct. 
This result is very similar to the one achieved by CGR. Yet,
in their model the IMF provides the country with resources before
a crisis takes place, not following a default. The different timing
of intervention lets the IMF reduce crisis probabilities not only
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10 Proofs of PROPOSITIONS 1 and 2 are shown in Appendix B. via investors’ expectations, but also, directly, by means of
increasing country’s liquid resources. Debtor will have more funds
than to reimburse creditors who wish to withdraw their capital,
and this will reduce the cost of early liquidations. CGR term this
as the direct effect of IMF intervention on the probability of a
crisis. Moreover, in the original model, the IMF is modeled as a
player, just like international investors. Realistically, the authors
assume that the Fund will decide to finance a country only if it
expects its own intervention to avoid a crisis, so as to be able to
recover, afterwards, the disbursed funds.
3.6 Contagion
Proceeding backwards, we will now examine what determines
the size of IMF intervention in aid of B. Due to the assumptions
we made in 3.2, the reimbursement promised to each creditor of
B will be equal to
The average of λB will be
(9)
From which it follows that
(10)
From (8) and (10) follows
PROPOSITION 4. The limitation of IMF resources creates a
positive correlation between the probabilities of a crisis in the two
economies.






 =+−⋅ λλλ ARA A Pdf
   λλ λλ B RAA R A Pdf Pdf =⋅ + + ⋅ () ( – ) 1















                      
     (– )
with probability
with probability   Λ 1
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
82(11)
The ILLR has a limited amount of liquidity. Hence, if one
country is forced to default and receives IMF financings, the other
one will have a smaller quantity of resources in the event of a
crisis. Yet, as we showed in the previous section, in this model
the ex-ante probability of a crisis is influenced by the size of IMF
intervention. As a result, the limitation of Fund resources creates
a form of contagion between the two economies: if a crisis strikes
in  A, the probability of a default in B will rise. Therefore, the
limitation of IMF resources may turn it into a contagion channel. 
3.7 The Equilibrium in Country A
Due to the hypotheses we made on the parameters in the two
economies, the values of sA* and 
–
RA that characterize A’s
equilibrium are identical to the thresholds we derived for country
B in 3.5 (see equations (4) and (5)). Following the same reasoning
as in paragraph 3.5.2, we can prove that the effects of IMF
intervention are the same in both economies, in particular
(12)
11
3.8 The Optimal IMF Action in the Presence of Contagion
3.8.1 The Allocation of Funds
We will now introduce a new period in the game, anterior to
the others, time 0. We assume that at time 0 the IMF knows the
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11 Clearly, proofs are the same as in paragraph 3.5.2.limited resources. It must decide how to commit its funds between
the two economies in order to minimize the total ex-ante
probabilities of a crisis. The IMF knows that in each economy an
increase in the reimbursement pledged to every creditor, reduces
the probability of a crisis (see (8) and (12)).
Moreover, given Λ,
(13) λR = Λ – λA
If we assume that the burden of a crisis is the same in both
the countries (which lets us normalize to 1 the cost of a default
in both the economies), the problem faced by the IMF will consist
in choosing the value of λA which
where:
In order to minimize total ex-ante crisis probabilities, IMF
must take into account the effect on B’s  probabilities of default,
of a variation in the funds promised to A’s  creditors.
By means of deriving
=====
PdfB with respect to λA we get:
(14)
An increase in λA has a twofold effect on 
=====
PdfB. On the one
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commit directly to B ((Λ – λA)↓); on the other, it causes a fall in
the probability of a crisis in country A and, consequently, raises
the chances that each creditor of B is provided with a
reimbursement equal to Λ ((1 – PdfA)↑). The sign of ∂
=====
PdfB /∂λA
depends on which of these two effects is greater. Notice that, if
ex-ante crisis probabilities in B are very small when its creditors
are promised the whole volume of IMF funds, (14) can be
approximated with 
(15)
The left hand side of (15) represents the elasticity of the
probability of a crisis in country A with respect to the size of IMF
intervention. The right hand side shows the reactivity of country
B’s crisis probabilities with respect to the volume of funds
promised to the other country’s creditors, evaluated in Λ – λA. If
the LHS of (15) is bigger than the RHS, 
=====
PdfB will increase when
λA rises, and vice versa. In order to clarify the discussion we make
in the next paragraph, we define country A highly contagious if
(15) holds with a major sign, moderately contagious otherwise. 
The problem faced by the IMF has two different solutions,
depending on ∂
=====
PdfB /∂λA to be bigger or smaller than zero.
CASE I
(16)
The strong contagion between the countries causes an
increase in the resources destined to A to determine a reduction
in the probability of a crisis in B. 
ILLR’s problem will be
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(17)
If the probability of a crisis in A is very sensitive to changes
in the reimbursement pledged to its creditors, the Fund will find
it optimal to allocate the totality of its resources to this country.
CASE II
(18)
In this case, on average, crisis probabilities in B increase when
the funds promised to A’s  creditors rise. Yet, as we show in
Appendix B, due to contagion, the IMF will find it optimal to
commit more than half its resources to economy A. Indeed, by
means of reducing crisis probabilities in this economy, the Fund
decreases also, indirectly, the probability of a default in the
infected country.
In this case the solution to the IMF problem will be
(19) λA*>1/2 . Λ
From (17) and (19) follows
PROPOSITION 8. In order to allocate its resources between the
economies so as to minimize the total probabilities of a crisis, the
IMF will decide to give a larger share to the economy from which
contagion spreads. 
Λ≥λ A*>1/2 . Λ
Thus, the Fund should take into account this form of
contagion it contributes in creating, when planning emerging
markets’ bailouts. In particular, the IMF should pre-commit more
resources to countries that are more likely to be hit first by a
crisis. These commitments should also be larger, the more
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paragraph. We must note that the differences in the treatment
reserved to each economy do not stem from “political” distortions.
They are indeed the result of a process of minimization of the
total probabilities of a crisis, and thus constitute an optimal
solution. 
3.8.2 Contagiousness of Countries
Given the conclusions of our model, form a normative point
of view, it is extremely important that the IMF be able to identify
the economies from which contagion is more likely to spread.
First, notice that, given the structure of the model, country A —
the first to be exposed to the risk of a crisis — the one from which
contagion arises. Hence, in general we can claim that the time
order has certain relevance. It could be useful if in every particular
circumstance the Fund could identify the countries that are more
likely to be hit first by a crisis
12. In this respect, the IMF could
use its role of monitorer to look at several factors, such as external
debt burden, political stability and production structure
13. A
constant monitoring of the condition of the economies and of the
economic situation, could therefore allow the Fund to identify in
every circumstance the countries that are more vulnerable to the
risk of a crisis. 
Moreover, based on the conclusions we derived in the previous
paragraph, we can distinguish several degrees of contagiousness
of the country from which the crisis spreads. If (16) holds, we can
define economy A highly contagious, moderately contagious if (18)
holds. Notice that, from the point of view of the country from
which the crisis originates, for every level of the parameters
International Monetary Fund Resources and Contagion, etc. F. VIANI
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12  Obviously, the model we are examining does not allow us to study
analytically this problem, because, by construction, the time order of crises is
exogenous. 
13 Usually the emerging-market economies that are very dependant on the
export of one single commodity and do not diversify their production tend to be
strongly exposed to external shocks in goods prices and exchange rates, and should
therefore be considered quite risky. relative to the infected country, the higher the reactivity to the
IMF intervention of A’s  crisis probabilities, the more contagious
this economy is. If A’s  elasticity is bigger than the reactivity of
economy  B evaluated in λR, crises probabilities in the two
countries will move in the same direction when the size of the
resources devoted to A’s  creditors varies. Vice versa, if A is
moderately contagious, they will move in opposite directions when
λA varies. Hence, there are other elements worth to be taken into
account by the IMF, namely economies’ fragility and the
responsiveness of their crisis probabilities to bailouts and external
interventions. Also in this case, a deep analysis of the previous
crisis episodes and their resolution, plus the structure and internal
characteristics of each country, may help in this identification.
3.8.3 Time Inconsistency of the Interventions
The problem of optimal allocation of funds aimed at the
minimization of total crisis probabilities, which we examined in
paragraph 3.8.1, can become more complex and tricky, if the IMF
cannot credibly commit itself to the actual disbursement of the
resources promised to creditors. 
To  illustrate this point, we assume that the Fund at time 0
solves the problem described in paragraph 3.8.1. Furthermore, we
hypothize that in period 3, after having observed whether country
A was hit by a crisis, the IMF could change its decisions about
the funds to be paid out to A’s  creditors. Of course, the Fund’s
goal is again the minimization of the total crisis probabilities in
the two economies. When revising the allocation of resources, the
IMF can consider as given the probabilities of a crisis in economy
A
14. Naturally, in this case the Fund will choose to change its
previous decisions and will devolve the whole amount of its
resources to economy B. Hence, A’s  creditors will not receive the
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14 Notice that the results highlighted in this section remain valid even in the
event that the IMF can change its choices at time 2, after A’s  creditors decided
whether to withdraw their funds. Also in this case the Fund can consider the
probabilities of a crisis in A, invariant with respect to λA. funds they were promised at time 0. Therefore, there exists a
problem of time inconsistency of the resources promised by the
Fund to the two economies. Notice that this result does not stem
from any kind of opportunistic behavior of the IMF, but only from
an optimization process aimed at ensuring the efficient allocation
of resources. 
Obviously, time inconsistency constitutes an obstacle to the
effectiveness of IMF interventions. If A’s  creditors know that the
Fund has an ex-post incentive to change its decisions, they will
consider uncertain the volume of resources they were promised.
Accordingly to they own confidence in the credibility of IMF
promises, the effectiveness of the intervention on A’s  crisis
probabilities may dramatically decrease and even plunge to zero.
Thus, in order to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the
intervention is essential that the Fund credibly commit itself to
the provision of the resources promised to each country. 
3.8.4 An Example of Two-way Contagion
The model we developed in the previous paragraph can be
extended to describe a situation in which the ex-ante crisis
probabilities of the two countries influence each other. The aim
of this section is to show that when dealing with this kind of
contagion, the allocation of the Fund’s resources grows more
complex, because contagion may originate from both economies. 
Assume that A’s  creditors expect to receive some additional
kind of help with respect to the official commitment the Fund
makes in t=1, if the IMF has enough resources left after having
possibly bailed out the other country. Referring to the timing
described in paragraph 3.1, this is equivalent to assuming that A’s
creditors, in t=1, believe that, if country B is not hit by a crisis,
the IMF will use the remaining resources at time 6, Λ – λA, to
additionally refund them of the loss suffered in the event of a
default. We specify that, given the current mechanisms of
intervention of the IMF, it is extremely unlikely that the Fund itself
could promise this kind of help. Indeed, once a certain amount
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the uncommitted usable resources, and cannot be assigned to any
other country. Yet, it is sensible to think that if country A is
particularly important from a political or strategic point of view,
its creditor will expect a privileged treatment. Thus, they may
think they will be refunded of the loss suffered in a crisis more
than the Fund officially announced at time 1, if the IMF has
enough resources to do it
15. 
From the analysis of crisis probabilities carried out in
Appendix B, we get 
were 
=
λA=PdfB.λA+(1–PdfB).Λ is the amount of resources that A’s
creditors expect to receive from the Fund.
16. Thus, the probability
of a crisis in B are influenced from country A’s ones and vice ver-
sa.
In Appendix B we solve the problem of the IMF. From it we
get two relevant results. First, the probabilities of a crisis in A do
not necessarily decrease when the amount of resources officially
committed to this country by the Fund increases. This happens
because an increase in λA causes the resources formally promised
to A to raise, but also an increase in B’s  crisis probabilities. The
total effect on
=
λA, and hence on PdfA, is uncertain. As we show
in the appendix, if 
(20)
when  λA increases,
=
λA diminishes, rising ex-ante A’s  crisis
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15 Notice that, in order to generate two-way contagion, it is not necessary that
the Fund actually pay out these expected extra resources. Yet, the IMF may really
find it optimal to provide this additional help if it can, in order, for instance, to
restore investors’ confidence in a particularly important country, so as to prevent
possible future crises.
16 We are assuming that A’s creditors do not discount the liquidity received at
time 3 with respect to the one gotten at time 6.probabilities. The right hand side of equation (20) represents the
share of resources officially promised to A on the additional
liquidity that those who invested in this country expect to receive
at time 6 if B is not forced to default. Hence, if the probabilities
of a crisis in B increase a lot when λA increases, or if the volume
of extra funds expected by A’s creditors is big, ∂PdfA/∂λA>0. In this
case, we can consider country B highly contagious. 
The second remarkable result concerns the optimal allocation
of the Fund’s resources. If ∂PdfA/∂λA<0, the optimal choice is
identical to the one described in 3.8.1. If instead ∂PdfA/∂λA >0 ,
due to the high contagiousness of country B, the IMF will decide
to provide it with its own whole resources. Therefore, it is essential
that, in situations that can give rise to two-way contagion — the
one we described in this paragraph is just an example — the Fund
carefully evaluate the potential contagiousness of all the
economies so as to plan its own interventions. 
4. - Concluding Observations 
The financial crises that hit many emerging markets in the
last years, forced politicians and economists to cope with the need
of reforming the international financial architecture. Though
analysts do not agree on the solution to be adopted, many suggest
that the IMF should play an important role in preventing crises,
particularly acting as an International Lender of Last Resort. Yet,
in the last ten years the magnitude of financial crises showed the
Fund resources to be limited if compared with the amounts of
liquidity necessary to manage these episodes. In this essay, we
used for the first time a theoretical model to examine the
possibility that the IMF, due to the limitation of its resources, may
turn into a contagion channel. As showed in section 2, we should
not underestimate this risk, given the resources the IMF can use
to provide loans, nor can we rule out such a situation to have
taken place in fact in the late Nineties. 
In order to analyze this threat and its implications for the
conduct of the Fund, we used a modified version of CGR global-
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91game model (2003, 2004). Compared with the original model, ours
is extended to cover two countries, and shows significant changes
in the timing structure. As in the original model, we obtain that
a partial IMF intervention is effective in reducing the ex-ante
probability of a crisis. In particular, we proved that an increase
in the reimbursement pledged to each creditor in the event of a
crisis reduces the probability of a default. 
The changes made to the original model let us achieve an
important result that was not possible to derive from CGR: IMF
limited resources create a positive correlation between the
probabilities of a crisis in the two economies. Therefore, our work
shows that the Fund, due to the limitation of its means, may
develop into a contagion channel.
Moreover, the IMF should take into account this form of
contagion in allocating its resources between the economies. In
particular, we proved that it should allocate more resources to the
country from which a crisis is more likely to spread in order to
minimize the total probabilities of a default. 
It is clear that the model presented here can be further
developed and may be used as a starting point for empirical
analyses aiming at evaluating the relevance that in reality had this
kind of contagion. To this purpose, an interesting research field
could be the one of the late-Nineties financial crises. In particular,
it could be important to evaluate to what extent investors’ fear
about the scarcity of IMF resources following the Asian crisis,
could have contributed to trigger the subsequent Brazilian and
Russian defaults. The results of this analysis could determine the
actual relevance for the diffusion of the crises of the limitation of
IMF resources, a contagion channel that we proved to be plausible
from a theoretical point of view. 
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1. - The Fund’s Resources: Quotas and Borrowing 
Arrangements
The largest share of IMF resources is made up of the quotas
that member countries pay when joining the organization. The
last general modification was decided during the Eleventh review,
in 1998, and consisted in a 45% increase in quotas, which now
amount to $331 billion. Yet, the aggregate describing the volume
of liquidity deriving from quotas, which is effectively available to
supply new loans are the uncommitted usable resources
17.
Uncommitted usable resources are fairly smaller than the total
quotas paid by members: $143 billion against quotas’ $331 bil.
In order to increase its liquidity resources, the Fund signed
two borrowing arrangements with official creditors, the General
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements to
Borrow (NAB).
To  the purpose of the current discussion, it is important to
notice that GAB was activated for the last time in 1998 to finance
the Russian bailout, while NAB, designed in 1995 to address the
huge financing needs requested by the new crises, such as the
Mexican one, was activated only one time, in 1998, to cope with
Brazil’s Balance of Payments disequilibria. 
The funds borrowed through GAB and NAB constitute a
liability for the IMF, and the interest rate applied to them is above
market-average. So in reality these borrowing arrangements tend
not to be activated, with the little exception of extremely distressed
periods. Moreover, the Fund may have to cope with reputational
problems that, in fact, prevent or strongly discourage GAB and
NAB activation. For instance, the more the IMF is exposed with
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17 See next paragraph for a detailed description of this and other aggregates
representing the resources of the Fund. its loans, the less global taxpayers — which ultimately constitute
its financers — will be keen on accepting the disbursement of new
funds. Consequently, borrowing arrangements will be seldom
activated. Therefore, in reality, their existence is not sufficient to
question the essential limitation of IMF resources.
2. - IMF Resources: The Aggregates 
Uncommitted usable resources: they include the national
currencies of member countries with a sound BoP balance, the
SDR
18 held by the IMF, and, if the GAB or NAB have been
activated, the funds available through these arrangements. They
do not include undrawn balances under arrangements, the funds
already committed but not disbursed, yet. In order to gauge the
capacity to provide new loans, the Fund account sheets use also
another aggregate named one-year forward commitment capacity,
equal to the uncommitted usable resources plus the
reimbursements the IMF expects to get in a one-year time. Given
that the calculus of this second quantity is based upon forecasting,
not upon established data, we preferred to use the uncommitted
usable resources. 
As concerns this aggregate, there are not monthly data
available for the periods January-March and May-September 1997,
and January-March and May-September 1998. The values relating
to this periods have been approximated with the medium of the
extremes of the intervals. 
Total committed resources: they include the funds committed
(amount agreed) to the most important countries that were hit by
a crisis between 1997 and 2004, countries that were chosen on
the basis of the size of their rescue packages and of the magnitude
of their crises. Therefore, the aggregate refers only to some
economies
19 and constitutes merely a rough measure of the
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18 SDR is an international asset used almost exclusively in the transactions
between the IMF and member countries. It is exchangeable for the currencies of
countries with a sound BoP situation.
19 In particular, to Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Russia,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay.resources the IMF totally provided to its members during this
period. 
Please note that the amount agreed refers to the resources the
Fund consents to commit to crisis-hit countries within specific
credit agreements. For several reasons, it does not always match
the amount of liquidity that is actually disbursed.
The two series of data are on a monthly base; the source of
the both of them is the IMF web site. For a more in-depth
description of these and other aggregates portraying the Fund
resources’ situation, see the accounting documents named
Financial Statement and  IMF’s Financial Resources and Liquidity
Position, available at http://www.imf.org/external/fin.htm. 





































































































































































1. - Threshold Value for the Fundamental 
For each country j, we define
–
Rj, the value of the rate of return
such that, given xj (the fraction of investors who decide to
withdraw their capital after just one period) if Rj >
–
Rj, the country
is not forced to default. From (2) we know that
–
Rj must be such
that
The rate of return below which j will be forced to default is
where Rs is the value of Rj below which j incurs a crisis even if
no investor withdraws his funds
20. Therefore, given xj, the
distribution of Rj is partitioned into two areas, as Graph 3. Thus,
the fundamental must be bad enough for the investors to trigger
a crisis. 
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20  Through withdrawal, creditors cause costly liquidations of investment









Rj Rj2. - The Equilibrium in Country B: Derivation of the Threshold
Values
I. - Threshold Value for the Fundamental
In equilibrium each creditor will try to estimate the fraction
of other investors whom will receive a signal sB ≤ sB* and will
consequently decide to withdraw their capitals. Through the
accumulation function of εB, agents will estimate the probability
that, if RB =
–
RB, investors will receive a signal smaller than sB*.
The fraction of investors who will choose to withdraw the
financings at time 5, when RB =
–
RB, will be





Substituting (21) in (3) we get the first equilibrium condition
(22)
II. - Threshold Value for the Private Signal
Given the conditional payoffs b and  c, and given λB, the
expected payoff of each investor is
(23) w = b[1–G(
–





RB – sB) is the probability, estimated through the c.d.f. of
εB, that, when an investor gets a signal equal to sB, RB is inferior
to 
–
RB. Each creditor finds it optimal not to withdraw his capital
up to the point in which his expected payoff is equal to zero.
Equating (23) to zero we obtain the second equilibrium condition
(24)










   
RR k













[( * – ) – ]
–
International Monetary Fund Resources and Contagion, etc. F. VIANI
97III. - Equilibrium
Solving the system formed by (22) and  (23) we get the
equations  (4) and  (5) presented in the text, that is to say the
threshold values that characterize the equilibrium in country B.
3. - Proposition 1: Proof
We  know that the investment projects’ rate of return is
normally distributed with mean RM and variance 1/ρ. For the
graphic proof of Proposition 1, see Graphs 4 and 5, in which is
shown the effect on the area of probability of a crisis, respectively
of an increase in 
–
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GRAPH 4





RB RB4. - Proposition 2: Proof
In order to proof Proposition 2 we must derive (4) and  (5)
with respect to λB
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GRAPH 5






sB* sB5. - Proposition 8: Proof
We want to show that if 
the solution to the IMF problem is λA*>1/2.Λ.
The f.o.c. derived from the Fund minimization problem is:
Assume that λA*=Λ/2.
Evaluated in this value, the f.o.c. becomes:
The second line stem from the fact that the crisis probabilities
of the two countries, due to the assumptions we made, are equal
ex-ante. Hence,
To derive the third line, it is sufficient to notice, following an
analogue reasoning that PdfA(Λ/2) = PdfB(Λ/2).
Hence, in λA*=Λ/2, the derivative of the objective function
with respect to λA is less than zero. Taking into account that the
IMF is solving a minimization problem, we can conclude that for
the first order derivative to be equal to zero, it is necessary that
λA*>1/2.Λ.
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1006. - Two-way Contagion
Following the same reasoning carried on in paragraph 3.5.2,
noticing that now A’s  crisis probabilities depend on the amount
of liquidity that its creditors expect to receive, and assuming they
are not aware of the contagion generated by A, we get PdfB(λB – )
and  PdfA(
=
λA – ), where 
=
λA .  = (1–PdfB)  . Λ + PdfB . λA. From this last
expression, we may derive ∂
=
λA . / ∂PdfB < 0. The funds received on
average by B’s creditors are 
=
λB= (1–PdfA) .Λ+PdfA.λR, from which
we get ∂λB / ∂PdfA < 0. Hence,
The IMF solves the following problem:
where:
Let’s analyze the effect of a variation in λA on the amount of
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identical to that derived in 3.8.1: Λ > λA*>1/2 . Λ. 
If, instead:
then
From this follows that 
21
Since the ex-ante crisis probabilities in both the economies
are decreasing functions of λA, the solution to the IMF
optimization problem is λA*=0 .
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